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Summary 
The Norwegian Ministry of Transport’s (MoT) 2002 White Paper on Public Transport paved 
the way for the introduction of performance-based contracts for rail passenger service 
obligations (PSO). The rationale was that such contracts provide a better allocation of risk and 
responsibilities between authorities and the operators, and will give further incentives for cost 
and market efficient solutions in passenger rail operations. 
 
We have used a simulation model for public transport in order to estimate socially optimal 
subsidies, which encourage Norwegian State Railways (NSB) to increase patronage and to 
take external costs and benefits into account. By optimal subsidy regime we mean that the 
arrangement combines the social surplus maximising objectives of the MoT with the NSB's 
commercial goals, such that net social surplus (NSS) is maximised compared to the present 
situation. Within the model NSS comprises: (1) change in NSB’s profit (producer surplus); 
(2) change in passengers benefit (consumer surplus); (3) changes in environmental and 
congestion costs; and (4) resource cost of public funds. 
 
Through a series of model iterations we have designed a combination of subsidies per 
passenger, per train kilometre and for seat capacity. With these incentives, NSB will, on a 
commercial basis, strive towards service levels that resemble the social surplus maximising 
levels of service. The subsidies internalise the benefits to existing and new passengers and the 
effect on road congestion of rail service improvements into NSB’s decision criteria. They also 
reflect the fact that rail fares are regulated. The performance-based subsidies will bring about 
a welfare gain in the region of NOK 8 million (€1 equals about NOK 8). The subsidies 
received under this regime together with the passenger revenue, may exceed the costs of the 
operator. To cope with this, we recommend that a fee is charged for the right to operate under 
this contractual regime. 
 
There is a risk that the incentives will motivate the operators to focus their efforts entirely on 
train kilometre, seat capacity and passenger numbers to the degree that they overlook other 
important aspects of service quality, like punctuality, cleanliness, information etc. As a safety 
net, we recommend a set of additional conditions and bonus/malus arrangements. Most 
important are (1) bonus/malus for train cancellations and delays, based on the principles of 
internalising passengers’ benefits or costs into NSB’s decision criteria; and (2) the threat of 
tendering if quality measurements and performance levels fall below certain levels. 
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Background and purpose 
The existing contracts between the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications 
(MoT) and the Norwegian State Railways (NSB, state-owned limited company) consist of 
three documents: a principal (“timeless”) agreement, a 4-year framework agreement and the 
annual agreement on purchase of passenger service obligation (PSO) services. For the 
negotiations over a new framework agreement 2003-2006 the MoT wanted to introduce 
elements of financial incentives in the contract. The aim was to launch a performance-based 
contract (PBC) in which the incentives combine the social benefit maximising objectives of 
the MoT with NSB’s commercial goals. The intention is that this brings about more efficient 
resource allocation. 
 
The Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics (TOI) was commissioned to develop the 
main principles of such a contractual regime for the three Norwegian intercity lines (all 
originating in Oslo and about 180 km each). The aim was to design a contract in which the 
incentives combine the social surplus maximising objectives of the MoT with the Norwegian 
State Rail’s (NSB) commercial goals. This is a novel and promising approach to contracting 
for public transport services. The project has been reported in Fearnley, Bekken and Norheim 
(2002a and 2002b) 
 
Towards achievement of both allocative efficiency and X-
efficiency in Passenger rail services 
The problem of X-inefficiency has been a driving force behind the increased use of 
competitive tendering in public transport including passenger rail services. This problem is 
related to continuously making an operator produce a given output in a cost efficient manner 
(also referred to as technical efficiency). In Norway, the threat of tendering by itself seems to 
have had more or less the same impact on X-efficiency in urban public transport (Johansen et 
al 2001). Thus, the problem to facilitate X-efficiency seems to be well handled by competitive 
tendering or even by the threat of such. The main problem at present is to assure allocative 
efficiency without creating problems of X-inefficiency. 
 
The problem of allocative efficiency is well known. When operators adjust service levels 
according to their own business considerations they will improve service levels only to the 
point where the cost of the improvement is exactly offset by the increased revenue (i.e., 
private marginal cost equals private marginal revenue). This will maximise the profits of the 
operator. From a social point of view this will lead to an inefficient resource allocation. The 
reason is that external costs and benefits are not accounted for. Most important is the fact that 
the operator only considers the extra revenue raised and not the fact that quality 
improvements benefit existing passengers as well. Further, there are external costs and 
benefits of private car and rail transport. The car is regarded as a substitute for train, such that 
changes in rail service levels or fares will have an impact on car use. 
 
The incentive contract model which we have developed seeks to internalise the external 
effects into the operators commercial decision criteria, and thus to stimulate to a socially 
optimal level of service. In particular, the benefit to existing passengers and the cost of 
congestion is internalised into the operator’s commercial decision criteria. Allocative 
efficiency should also reflect the facts that public funds have a resource cost and alternative 
use and hence a shadow price. This is also included in our model. 
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TOI's simulation model for public transport systems 
TOI has previously developed a simulation model for public transport, which has been 
applied to local public transport in several Norwegian urban areas (see e.g. Johansen and 
Norheim (1999 and 2000), Carlquist et al (1999) and Larsen (1993)). Its base principles are 
documented in Johansen et al (2001). We have further developed this simulation model in 
order to make it suitable for the Norwegian intercity rail market.  
 
The model is based on and simulates the behaviour by a profit-maximizing operator. 
However, within the model, we have internalised different external effects. In particular, the 
benefit from existing passengers is included as well as additional costs and benefits related to 
transfer of car traffic. Furthermore, the model allows for inclusion of additional constraints 
related to capacity, fares, total amount of subsidies and minimum levels of service. This is 
important to make the model more credible. 
 
The model calculates changes from a reference point. Thus the model estimates the changes 
in net social surplus rather than the overall social surplus. Formally, it is a matter of non-
linear programming with non-linear constraints. Within the model, changes in net social 
surplus (NSS) comprises of: 
  
1. Change in NSB’s profit (producer surplus);  
2. Change in passengers benefit (consumer surplus);  
3. Changes in environmental and congestion costs (externalities), and  
4. Resource cost (shadow price) of public funds. 
 
The model considers three "periods" of demand: (i) Demand in peak periods at sections of the 
route where the capacity is at it’s limit (Design capacity demand); (ii) Other peak-period 
demand; and (iii) Off-peak demand. Further, service levels are separated into two distinct 
categories: a base service level which runs throughout the operating hours, and the additional 
peak services that add to the basic services during peak periods.  
 
A full NSS maximisation means that the model determines social optimal levels of 7 
variables. Equally, profit maximization determines the profit maximizing levels of the same 
variables. The variables determined in the model are: 
• Fare levels for the 3 periods of demand 
• Train-kilometres produced in basic services and additional peak services 
• Capacity provided per train kilometre in basic services and additional peak services 
 
The model can next be used to identify a socially optimal subsidy regime. The optimal 
subsidy regime is the one that makes the profit maximising behaviour by the operator 
resemble the situation of maximum social surplus. To make the operator behave optimally, 
different incentives must be applied. By identifying the socially optimal adjustments first, and 
then to run the model to simulate a profit maximising operator's behaviour under different 
incentives, we can adjust the incentives until the profit maximising operator acts in a socially 
optimal way. 
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Model specification and calibration 
The model looks at changes from a reference point. This reference point refers to a certain 
budget year for NSB. Both a cost function and a demand function have to be calibrated as to 
calculate the changes from this reference situation.  
 
The cost function consists of a few but important elements. These are: 
• Mileage-related costs, which include personnel, maintenance, energy and cleaning. These 
costs are assumed to increase proportionally with train size. Mileage-related costs are 
higher for extra services (during peak) mainly because of less efficient utilisation of 
labour and capital.  
• Passenger-related costs, which are related to ticketing costs. 
• Design capacity costs. This is the capital cost of the train fleet that is needed in order to 
cater for the peak demand periods. This cost depends on the fleet size, its re-purchase 
value, and the amortisation factor. An important feature is that the marginal design 
capacity cost will be much higher during peak hours compared to off-peak periods.    
• Costs depending on operating hours. These are fixed costs of keeping the system up and 
running and do not vary with service levels. 
 
The calibration of the cost function is based on data made available by NSB. The starting 
point to which the cost function is calibrated, resembles the actual costs reported by NSB for 
a reference year. The calibrated cost function is different between the basic services offered 
and the additional peak services. This is primarily related to the design capacity cost, which is 
designed to cater for the peak demand periods and the less efficient utilisation of labour and 
capital during peak services.  
 
Demand for intercity rail services is determined by the following aspects of the journey; price, 
service frequency, crowding, and to some extent travel time. Conditions and circumstances 
outside the railway (like petrol prices) are not explicitly part of the model, but are mirrored in 
the elasticities that form the basis for calibration of the model. Demand is a function of 
generalised travel costs, G. We have chosen the following functional form.  
 
X(G) = V *exp[(-a/b) *Gb] = ( ) bGbaeVGX −∗=)(  
 
where X  is number of passengers per route per hour  
V, a and b are constants to be calibrated. a, b > 0 
 
This function makes the elasticity of demand increase when G increases. This is a property of 
public transport demand which we find in many market studies, see e.g. Carlquist and 
Fearnley (2001). 
 
A special feature of this function, however, is that it only implicitly defines X, as G is again a 
function of X itself. Increased demand increase travel time and also crowding, both leading to 
higher generalised costs of travel. This implies that X is in fact an explanatory variable for 
X(G), and occurs both on the left and the right hand side of the equation. 
The following demand elasticities can be derived.  
 
The demand elasticity w.r.t. G increases as G increases: 
 
εG = δX/δG *G/X= -a*Gb  < 0 
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The demand elasticity w.r.t. the fare level, P, increases proportionally with the fare level, and 
at the same time the indirect effect via G is determined by the term (b-1): 
 
εP = δX/δP *P/X= -P*a*Gb-1 < 0 
 
The demand function has been calibrated to the three different periods of demand. We have 
used data from NSB as input to the demand function, and used demand elasticities taken from 
the Norwegian national transport model to calibrate it. 
 
In addition to the cost and demand functions, the simulation model takes into account the 
effect of changes in the railway on car use, and the resource cost of public funds. It is 
assumed that rail traffic lost to the car increases road congestion during the peak period 
(remembering that all the three Norwegian intercity lines originate in Oslo), and hence 
represents a cost to society (negative externality). This cost, however, is partly internalised 
and corrected by the fact that most car users into Oslo pass toll roads. The resource cost 
(shadow price) of public funds is set to 25 percent of the subsidies paid. 
 
Different optima 
The simulation model has been run to estimate optimal adjustments in NSB’s intercity market 
given a number of assumptions about NSB’s freedom to determine fares and service levels. In 
theory there are several possible scenarios to be estimated. In practice, however, there are a 
limited number of options for the model runs. For example, fare levels are, and are likely to 
continue to be, capped at 1 percentage point above the retail price index (i.e. RPI+1). The 
relevant model runs should therefore use this as a constraint on the fare level. Table 1 shows 
selected model runs. All figures are changes relative to the current situation with respect to 
fares, service levels, and financial performance. 
 
Column I in Table 1 shows the social surplus maximising solution when fare levels are set to 
today’s average of NOK 76. In this situation the peak service frequency is increased by app. 1 
departure per hour. The seating capacity is also slightly higher than today. These changes 
bring about some increase in demand and a benefit to passengers of NOK 29m. The value of 
congestion relief resulting from the modal shift to train is estimated to NOK 2.2 m. The social 
surplus is reduced by NOK 22 m by the cost of raising public funds. The total estimated 
welfare gain compared to today’s situation is thus NOK 9m per year. This is obtained with 
only a marginal change in subsidy level from the current situation. 
 
Column II shows the results when the simulation model is specified to run a profit 
maximising, rather than net benefit maximising, scenario. Fares are not restricted in this 
model run. The resulting adjustment by NSB is characterised by particularly high fares, 
service levels that are dramatically reduced, and reduced seating capacity per train; a typical 
monopolistic behaviour. NSB will run a substantial financial surplus, but the cost to society 
exceeds this profit considerably. The change in social welfare is therefore negative, NOK 
-321m. The unregulated profit maximising solution is not at all desirable. Incentives, which 
motivate the profit-oriented operator to increase frequency and capacity, are needed. 
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Table 1: Model runs (all figures are changes from the starting point) 
 I II III 
 W-max, 
P=76 
Profit 
max 
Performance 
based 
subsidies 
Fare, design capacity rush, NOK 0 +150 0 
Fare, other rush traffic, NOK 0 +121 0 
Off peak fare, NOK 0 +195 0 
Services per hour, basic services -0,2 -1,6 -0,1 
Services per hour, rush hours +1,1 -1,5 +1,3 
Seats per train (capacity), rush  +29 -3 +3 
Seats per train off peak +19 -80 +2 
Million passengers per year +0,2 -3,3 +0,2 
Total costs NOK millions +19,4 -217,3 +15,9 
Total revenues NOK millions +12,5 +152,7 +11,4 
Operating surplus NOK millions -6,9 +370 +399,5 
Change in consumer surplus NOK m. +29,2 -756,4 +25,6 
Congestion relief NOK millions +2,2 -13 +2,2 
Change in cost of public funds, NOK m. -22,4 +448,7 -19,5 
Total welfare gain NOK millions +9,0 -320,7 +8,4 
Subsidy for train kilometre NOK m.   +145,4 
Subsidy for rush passengers NOK m.   +60,9 
Subsidy off-peak passengers NOK m.   +89,6 
Subsidy for seat capacity rush NOK m   +17,4 
Subsidy for seat capacity offpeak NOKm   +90,8 
Sum performance based subsidies, NOK m   +404,1 
(1 Euro is about 8 Norwegian Crowns (NOK)) 
 
 
Optimal incentives 
Given the difference between the social optimal solution and the profit maximizing solution, 
the question is then; how can the MoT give the profit oriented operator incentives to strive 
towards socially optimal levels of service?  
 
We know that fares are capped, and hence that NSB do not earn the full potential revenue 
from new passengers. Further, it is an explicit goal for the MoT to increase rail patronage. A 
subsidy related to patronage should therefore be part of the PBC scheme. Further and 
evidently, NSB can do little to reduce journey times, because this is largely determined by the 
quality and capacity of the rail track; a responsibility which lies with the Norwegian Rail 
Administration. Hence, passengers' travel time is not suitable for financial incentives. NSB's 
decisions may, however, have an impact on waiting time (changes in service frequency) and 
crowding (changes in seating capacity), which are important determinants of passengers' 
generalised costs, as described above. A subsidy arrangement which internalises these 
costs/benefits to existing and new passengers into NSB's decision criteria, will therefore be a 
step in direction of optimal incentives. 
 
Column III, in the table above, shows how performance based subsidies can combine the 
social benefit maximising objectives of the MoT with NSB’s commercial goals. This is a 
result of trying and failing with incentives that are related to passenger numbers, train 
kilometre (a proxy for service frequency since the network is fixed) and seat capacity per 
train. The model is run in the same way as in column II, i.e. profit maximising, but with 
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performance-based subsidies and pegged fare levels. The results in column III are obtained 
when NSB is offered: 
 
• NOK 30 (€3.75) per passenger during the rush hours, 
• NOK 24 (€3) per passenger off peak, 
• NOK 45 (€5.6) per train kilometre for extra peak services, 
• NOK 29.5 (€3.7) per train kilometre for basic services, 
• NOK 30 (€4) per 1000 seat kilometre during the rush hours, and 
• NOK 80 (€10) per 1000 seat kilometre off peak, 
 
With these incentives NSB, on a commercial basis, will strive towards service levels that to a 
large degree resemble the social benefit maximising levels in column I. The passenger 
compensations can alternatively be NOK 26 (€3.25) per passenger regardless of peak/off-
peak. While being far easier to administrate this will only alter the result marginally. 
 
We see that NSB will gain a large operating surplus, which mainly reflects the transfers from 
the MoT. Performance-based subsidies amount to NOK 404m per year. By charging NSB a 
lump sum fee equal to the operating surplus, for the right to operate under these performance-
based subsidies, the net subsidies at the starting point will be more or less equal to the current 
subsidies paid to NSB  
 
Illustration 1 gives an overview of this performance based subsidy regime at the starting 
point. The income of the operator, NSB, is equal to the passenger revenue plus the 
performance-based subsidies. The costs are equal to the ”lump sum” fee paid by NSB to the 
authorities for the right to operate under this regime plus the actual operating costs. The net 
subsidies paid by the authorities are equal to the difference between the performance-based 
subsidies paid and the “lump sum” payment received.  
   
Illustration 1: The performance based subsidy regime at the starting point 
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By having the ”lump-sum” charge defined in the contract over a period of time, this regime 
gives the operator great discretion to adjust towards the social optimum. Reducing costs can 
increase profits; hence the regime avoids major problems of X-efficiency. Furthermore, by 
moving the production in the direction of the welfare maximizing solution, increased 
performance based subsidies can be achieved; hence allocative efficiency can be achieved.   
 
The goal of the performance based subsidy regime is to make the operator adjust towards the 
social optimum. In Illustration 2, the effects from a 3% increase in production (vehicle kms) 
are illustrated. The increased passenger revenue does not offset the increased operating costs. 
Hence, without the performance based subsidies there will be no incentives to increase 
production. However, with the performance-based subsidies, the operator will be in a position 
to increase his profits by adjusting in the “right” direction.  
 
Illustration 2: Example of changes for the operator related to a 3% increase in production 
 
Effects from 3% increase in production
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Safety net 
There is a risk that the incentives will motivate the operator to focus their efforts entirely on 
train kilometre, seat capacity and passenger numbers to the degree that they overlook other 
important aspects of service quality, like punctuality, cleanliness, information, staff 
friendliness etc.  
 
NSB already operate near the track capacity limit on several of the lines. If they choose to put 
more trains on the network at certain times of the day in order to pocket more subsidies for 
train-kilometres, then this may jeopardise punctuality levels. We have therefore recommended 
a bonus/malus arrangement for punctuality in addition to the above arrangement. This should 
be based on passenger delays, in order to internalise their valuation of changes in punctuality. 
Our recommended bonus/malus is calculated as follows: change in aggregated minutes of 
train delays from the base year multiplied by an agreed average number of passengers per 
train multiplied by passengers’ valuation of delay time. Our estimate for the latter, based on 
previous Norwegian studies (Norheim and Stangeby 1993 and Kjørstad 1995), is NOK 1.67 
per minute.  
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Cancelled trains are particularly exasperating for passengers. Norwegian studies (Ruud and 
Frøysadal (2002), Nossum (2003), Norheim (1996)) suggest that passengers place a value of 
waiting time for cancelled and delayed services which is three times higher than the value of 
ordinary waiting time. Therefore NSB should be given strong incentives against train 
cancellations. We recommend, therefore, a malus per cancelled train-kilometre that is equal to 
3 times the subsidy per train-kilometre.  
 
As a “safety net” NSB and MoT should agree on a set of threshold-values, which entitle them 
to renegotiate the contract. For example, the contract should be renegotiated if the malus 
reaches a certain limit. Customer satisfaction surveys are also important in this respect. They 
can indicate the operator's performance on a range of quality aspects, and their overall 
performance. We recommend that customer satisfaction scores below a certain percentage of 
a base value (to be decided) should lead to renegotiation of the contract, or tendering. 
 
Conclusions 
We have developed a new and promising way to combine the social goals of the Ministry of 
Transport, who regulates and purchases train services, with the rail operator's profit 
maximising objective. This is called a performance-based contract. A main feature of the 
contract is the fact that incentives paid per train kilometre and per seat kilometre internalises 
existing passengers' benefit from increased service frequency and reduced crowding, 
respectively, into the operator's financial decision criteria. Further, the passenger incentives 
help to internalise the external costs of car use during rush hours: a transfer of traffic from the 
roads to rail will benefit other car users. Passenger incentives also correct for the fact that the 
Ministry is regulating fares.  
 
This performance-based contract, however, will result in performance-based subsidies well 
above the current level of subsidies. This is necessary to make the incentives strong enough. 
To cope with this increased subsidy level, we recommend that a lump-sum fee is charged for 
the right to operate on this contract. This approach combines the necessary strength of the 
incentives with the budget constraint of the authorities.  
 
Future expansions of this subsidy regime may be to tender such a performance-based contract. 
A promising way to do this would be to grant the right to operate under such a contract to the 
operator willing to pay the highest fee.   
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